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1 Introduction
Without capital market imperfections, the capital structure of a firm, including the size, the
maturity, and the currency composition of debts, should not matter for investment decisions.
The Asian financial crises provide a good opportunity to test this hypothesis, i.e., the irrele-
vance of finance in investment decisions. The devaluations that occurred during these crises
abruptly and massively altered the debt burdens of firms with foreign-denominated debts.
Because devaluations are exogenous events, at least from the perspectives of individual firms,
such episodes make it easier to identify a distinct role for financial factors in investment
decisions during financial crises.
This paper tests for the existence of a finance channel in the propagation of the Korean
financial crisis. It also provides a quantitative assessment of the eﬀect of foreign-denominated
debt on investment. This analysis provides a useful perspective on the likely benefits to fixed
versus flexible exchange rates during a financial crisis. A primary argument for maintaining
a fixed exchange rate is that a devaluation may adversely aﬀect balance sheets owing to the
presence of foreign-denominated debt.2 Our results imply that foreign-denominated debt plays
an important role in explaining heterogenous outcomes across firms during the crisis period.
The presence of foreign-denominated debt explains only a small fraction of the aggregate
investment decline that occurred during this episode however. Although foreign-denominated
debt was not an important determinant of aggregate investment spending, the financial crisis
does appear to work through the balance sheet. In particular, high interest rates combined
with low profits weakened firm balance sheets and exacerbated the crisis. Overall, financial
frictions can account for 50 to 80% of the observed drop in investment during this episode.
Theoretically, a devaluation can aﬀect investment through two distinct channels. First,
the devaluation increases competitiveness and raises the marginal profitability of capital for
firms that export. This increase in the marginal profitability of capital stimulates the invest-
ment of export-oriented firms.3 Second, the devaluation influences the debt burden of firms
— the value of debt relative to a firm’s ability to repay the debt. In the presence of financial
market imperfections, an increase in the debt burden causes a deterioration of the balance
sheet and an increase in the cost of external finance. As external finance becomes more costly,
firms reduce their investment.
2Frankel (2003) summarizes the relative benefits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates. Cepedes, Chang
and Velasco (2000), Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (2001), and Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007) analyze
these issues using small open-economy models.
3The devaluation may also aﬀect investment by changing the price index of investment goods. The increase
in the domestic price of foreign investment goods was oﬀset by a decline in the price of domestic investment
goods so that the relative price of investment goods stayed relatively constant throughout this period.
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Understanding the eﬀect of foreign-denominated debt for investment spending requires
firm-level data. We use a newly available panel-data set of Korean manufacturing firms to
assess the strength of the finance channel discussed above. Importantly, the data set provides
detailed information on the foreign exchange-rate exposure of the firm, both in terms of the
amount of exports and in terms of the amount of foreign-denominated debt.
We begin with a reduced-form regression analysis. The exchange rate crisis and ensuing
devaluation provide a natural experiment with which one can measure the combined eﬀect of
the devaluation on firm-level investment spending. A key point to this identification strategy
is that firms should respond diﬀerently to the devaluation depending on both the level of
foreign sales and the amount of foreign-denominated debt. Following the devaluation, firms
with high levels of foreign sales should increase their investment relative to other firms, while
firms with high levels of foreign-denominated debt should decrease their investment relative
to other firms. By controlling for exports, we cleanly identify the balance-sheet eﬀect of
foreign-denominated debt on investment spending.
The second part of the paper adopts a structural approach. It specifies a dynamic opti-
mization problem of a firm which produces for both domestic and foreign markets and issues
both domestic and foreign-denominated debt. The firm operates under a set of financial
and non-financial constraints. The dynamic program is used to estimate the structural rela-
tionship characterizing investment, profitability and financial conditions. We then conduct
counterfactual simulations to understand the role that foreign-denominated debt and financial
frictions played during the crisis period.
Several recent papers estimate the eﬀect of foreign-denominated debt on firm-level invest-
ment during currency devaluations. Using a sample of Latin American firms over the 1990’s,
Bleakley and Cowan (2002) find that the net eﬀect of the devaluation was likely positive
for firms with high levels of foreign-denominated debt. Because these authors do not have
separate information on the export status of firms, they are unable to distinguish balance-
sheet eﬀects from competitiveness eﬀects however. Aguiar (2004) examines the investment
behavior of Mexican firms during the 1994 pesos devaluation.4 By controlling for export
status, this study finds a negative eﬀect of foreign-denominated debt that is distinct from
the competitiveness eﬀect. Similarly, Desai, Foley and Forbes (2007) document a negative
response of firm-level investment to devaluations for local but not multi-national firms. These
papers adopt a reduced-form approach and therefore cannot formally quantify the eﬀect that
foreign-denominated debt exerts on investment.
Our paper is also related to the extensive literature on firm-level investment and capital
4Relatedly, Pratap and Urrutia (2003) calibrate a model to fit this episode.
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market imperfections.5 Much of this literature focusses on the role of cash flow for investment
spending. Although this literature finds strong evidence in favor of capital market imperfec-
tions (e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991)),
these findings have been criticized for not adequately controlling for the possibility that cash
flow is simply a proxy for investment opportunities or misinterpreting the relationship be-
tween investment, Q, and cash flow (Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1994), Kaplan and Zingales
(1997), Gomes (1999), Abel and Eberly (2002), Eberly, Rebelo and Vincent (2007)).
A key question in this literature is how to identify the eﬀect of shocks to the balance
sheet that are independent of investment opportunities. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Schleifer (1994) and Lamont (1997) adopt a natural-experiment approach by examining the
eﬀect of shocks to cash flow that are arguably exogenous to the firm or firm segment’s in-
vestment opportunities. More recent papers achieve identification by solving and estimating
the dynamic program of a firm under capital market imperfections (Cooper and Ejarque
(2003), Pratap and Rendon (2003), Bayraktar, Sakellaris and Vermeulen (2005), Hennessy
and Whited (2006)).
A major limitation of current structural estimates is the focus on a single shock that is
perfectly correlated with profit opportunities. In such environments, one cannot separately
identify the balance-sheet eﬀect from the fundamentals eﬀect without imposing strong as-
sumptions regarding technology or market structure. In addition to focussing on a single
shock environment, these models frequently abstract from adjustment costs, so that absent
capital market imperfections, capital accumulation is frictionless. Because capital market im-
perfections limit investment spending, these estimation procedures may not be robust to the
alternative hypothesis that investment responds to profits owing to sluggish adjustment on
the real side. By combining real frictions with financial frictions, and identification through
balance-sheet shocks we avoid such potential pitfalls.
In contrast to previous work that models firms as identical up to a single index of prof-
itability, our structural estimation procedure controls for both microeconomic heterogeneity
and macroeconomic shocks. Although macroeconomic shocks enlarge the state space and
raise the computational burden of our estimation procedure, they are necessary to model
the crisis episode. Introducing firm-level heterogeneity also raises the computational burden
but allows us to address potential biases that may confound identification of structural model
parameters. It also provides a theoretical justification for the common practice of controlling
for fixed firm and time eﬀects when applying indirect inference to panel data environments.
Importantly, our estimation results imply that coeﬃcient estimates obtained from reduced-
5Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) provide recent surveys of this literature
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form investment equations using standard panel data techniques imply reasonable structural
parameters for both adjustment costs and financial costs.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides summary
measures of our data. Section 3 formulates the decision problem of the firm and characterizes
the eﬃciency conditions. Section 4 explains our reduced-form empirical strategy and reports
the estimation results. Section 5 estimates the structural parameters using indirect inference;
Section 5 also derives the impulse response functions of heterogenous firms and evaluates
the role that financial factors and foreign-denominated debt played in the propagation of the
crisis.
2 Overview of Korean Financial Crisis
This section provides an overview of the investment behavior of Korean firms during the
financial crisis of 1997-1998. Figure 1 shows the impact of the crisis on our sample of man-
ufacturing firms.6 It plots the average ratios of investment, sales, and debt relative to total
assets. For comparison purposes, it also plots the annual average real exchange rate. All
variables are in logs and are normalized relative to their pre-crisis (1996) values.
The results in Figure 1 are consistent with the macroeconomic eﬀects described elsewhere
(Kruger and Yoo (2002), Gertler et al. (2003), ). Between the onset of the crisis in 1996 and
the trough of economic activity that occurred during 1998, sales fell 20% while investment
fell nearly 100%.
Figure 1 also plots the debt-to-asset ratio for our sample of firms. Debt is valued in local
currency and includes both the local-currency denominated debt and the foreign-currency
denominated debt. The 70% depreciation of the currency implies a sharp rise in the value of
foreign-denominated debt. As a result, the debt-to-asset ratio increases by 20% at the onset
of the crisis, reflecting the stress on balance sheets caused by the currency depreciation.
To investigate how the investment rate diﬀered in response based on the degree of a
firm’s foreign exchange-rate exposure, we divide firms by export status, and by the degree
of foreign-denominated debt. Firms are classified according to export status using the pre-
crisis average export to total sales ratio for each firm in our sample. We categorize firms as
high-export firms if this ratio is above the pre-crisis median value. Similarly, we classify firms
as high foreign-denominated debt firms based on the pre-crisis average foreign-denominated
debt to total debt ratio, again using the pre-crisis median value as our cutoﬀ. The average
investment rates for high versus low foreign-denominated debt and high versus low export
6We defer our data description until section 4.
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Figure 1: Investment, Sales and Debt during Financial Crisis.
firms are plotted in the upper two panels of figure 2.
Following the financial crisis, firms with high levels of foreign-denominated debt have low
rates of investment relative to firms with low levels of foreign-denominated debt. There is little
diﬀerence in the investment rate of firms with high levels of exports relative to firms with
low levels of exports. Because there is a positive correlation between foreign-denominated
debt exposure and foreign-sales exposure, high export firms tend to have higher foreign-
denominated debt ratios which oﬀset the beneficial eﬀects of the exchange rate depreciation.
By considering low versus high export firms separately, the lower panels of Figure 2 help
isolate the role of foreign-denominated debt on investment. For both high-export and low-
export firms, foreign-denominated debt appears to depress the investment rate. As shown
in the lower left panel, the eﬀect of foreign-denominated debt on investment is most severe
for firms with the greatest mismatch between foreign sales and foreign-denominated debt
exposures. Thus, the investment spending of the firms with high levels of foreign-denominated
debt but little export revenue to oﬀset the negative consequences of the devaluation appear
to be the most vulnerable during the financial crisis.
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Figure 2: Investment Rates
3 The Investment Model
This section presents the structural model of investment that is estimated. The model is a
standard convex-adjustment cost model of investment augmented to include financial market
imperfections. The model explicitly incorporates the eﬀect of exchange rates on investment
working through the two distinct channels outlined above: the eﬀect of exchange rates on
fundamentals, and the eﬀect of exchange rates on the firm’s balance sheet.
We consider the dynamic programming problem for a firm which chooses capital, k0, and
foreign and domestic debt, b0f and b
0
d, to maximize the present value of dividends d subject
to constraints on technology and a nonnegativity constraint on dividends. The recursive
formulation of the problem is given by
v(k, bd, bf , z, z−1) = max
k0,b0d,b
0
f ,d
½
(1 + λ)d+ μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z)v(k0, b0d, b
0
f , z
0, z)Q(z, dz0)
¾
(1)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the nonnegativity constraint, Λ(z0, z) is
the stochastic discount factor which the firm takes as given and μ is an exogenous survival rate
introduced for technical reasons. The vector z contains all relevant exogenous state variables
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in the model, i.e., z = [rd, e, e−1, z, Z] where z is an idiosyncratic shock to the production
function, Z is an aggregate shock which shifts the market demand, rd is the domestic risk free
rate, and e is the real exchange rate. The lagged real exchange rate is a state variable because
it helps to predict the evolution of the domestic interest rate under uncovered interest parity
(UIP). This point will be made clear in Section 5. Q(z, dz0) is a transition function of the
vector z. The presence of the lagged exogenous state variables z−1 as arguments of the value
function is due to the dependence of the agency cost on the lagged variables.
The dividend of the firm is defined as the sum of profits net of investment costs plus net
debt issuance:
d =
ÃX
i=d,f
φi (z) k
γi − σ
!
− i− c(i, k)−Rdbd − eRfbf + b0d + eb0f (2)
The profit function is the sum of domestic and foreign profits minus fixed costs to produc-
tion σ. Here γd and γf denote the elasticity of profit with respect to capital in domestic and
foreign markets, dictated by the degree of market power in each market. Profits in each market
depends on the exogenous profitability indices φi (z) which in turn depend on the exogenous
shocks to the firm.7 The price of investment goods is normalized to unity. Adjustment costs
are convex and constant-returns-to-scale, i.e., c1 > 0, c11 > 0 and c(αi, αk) = αc(i, k); capital
accumulates subject to the exponential depreciation rate δ.
Domestic debt is measured in local currency units and foreign-denominated debt is mea-
sured in foreign currency units. Rd and Rf denote the gross interest rate on domestic and
foreign bonds respectively where Rf is also measured in foreign currency units. The vector z
denotes the set of all relevant exogenous state variables.
To introduce financial frictions, we impose a zero dividend constraint on the dynamic
programming problem, i.e.,
d ≥ 0. (3)
We also assume that the total borrowing cost can be decomposed into a risk-free interest rate
and an external-finance premium,
Rf = (1 + rf)(1 + η) (4)
and
Rd = (1 + rd)(1 + η) (5)
7Details regarding market structure, production technology, and the stochastic discount factor are discussed
in section 5.
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where rf and rd denote the risk free rate on foreign and domestic bonds, respectively and η
denotes the common external-finance premium. Following Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998)
and Gomes (2001), this formulation assumes that financial constraints are summarized in a
single reduced-form external finance premium, η, combined with a dividend constraint that
limits new equity issuance.
The assumption of a common external finance premium on domestic and foreign-denominated
debt allows us to simplify the model and eliminate one endogenous state variable.8 Let
ω ≡ e−1bf
bd + e−1bf
denote the ratio of foreign-denominated debt to total debt in local currency units. Uncovered
interest parity implies that the firm cares about the total debt obligation b = bd + ebf but
is indiﬀerent exante between the currency composition of debt. Because the firm is exante
indiﬀerent to the currency composition of debt, the foreign-denominated debt ratio may be
taken as a fixed parameter for each firm rather than a choice variable.9 The programming
problem given by equations 1-4 is then equivalent to the following program with smaller
dimension
v(k, b, z, z−1;ω) = max
k0,b0d,b
0
f ,d
½
(1 + λ)d+ μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z)v(k0, b0, z0, z;ω)Q(z, dz0)
¾
(6)
where the dividend is redefined as
d =
ÃX
i=d,f
φi (z) k
γi − σ
!
− i− c(i, k)−
µ
e
e−1
¶
Rfωb−Rd (1− ω) b+ b0 (7)
Although the currency composition of debt is assumed to be fixed over time for each
firm, our empirical work allows it to vary cross-sectionally in a manner consistent with the
empirical relationship between the currency composition of debt and other key features of the
8By allowing for both adjustment costs and financial frictions, our model has two endogenous state variables
combined with three exogenous state variables that determine the macroeconomic environment. Adding a
third endogenous state variable would increase substantially the complexity of the numerical procedure used
to solve the value function, making structural estimation infeasible.
9In Albuquerque (2004), expost default and exit imply a non-linear payoﬀ structure to the firm. This non-
linearity generates a demand to hedge currency risk even when both the lender and debtor are risk neutral.
Our model assumes risk neutral lenders and debtors but does not explicitly model expost default and exit
owing to the complexity of the contracting framework implied by a model that allows for both adjustment costs
and financial frictions. Under these assumptions, the appendix shows that the UIP no-arbitrage condition
implies that firms are indiﬀerent exante between foreign and domestic debt. In this case, fixing the currency
composition does not reduce expected firm value.
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firm such as the export-to-sales ratio and leverage ratio.10 Thus while we recognize that at
a deeper level, hedging motives combined with market access are important determinants of
the currency composition of debt, we view the eﬀect of such motives on the investment policy
during the crisis period as second order relative to the direct eﬀect of the large (seventy-
percent) exchange rate devaluation on the balance sheet.
By imposing the UIP condition (1 + rd) = (1 + rf)E(e/e−1|z−1), the dividend can be
simplified to
d =
ÃX
i=d,f
φi (z) k
γi − σ
!
− i− c(i, k)− Ω (e, e−1;ω)Rdb+ b0 (8)
where
Ω (e, e−1;ω) ≡
∙
ω
e/e−1
E(e/e−1|z−1) + (1− ω)
¸
(9)
and e/e−1E(e/e−1|z−1) denotes the surprise to the exchange rate. The term Ω (e, e−1;ω) is a pric-
ing function which translates the current value of debt outstanding into local currency units
conditional on the currency composition ω. An unanticipated devaluation causes an unantic-
ipated increases in the local currency value of debt outstanding in direct proportion to the
share of foreign-denominated debt. Thus, if ω = 0, the exchange rate devaluation has no
impact on current debt obligations, whereas if ω = 1, the exchange rate devaluation causes a
one-for-one increase in the value of current debt outstanding.11
The external-finance premium is parsimoniously specified as
η(x) ≡ κ [exp (x)− 1] (10)
where
x ≡ x (k, b, z−1)
and κ is a parameter that governs the strength of the financial friction. The x (·) function
is chosen to satisfy the following properties: i) an increase in capital reduces the external
finance premium, ii) an increase in debt increases the premium, iii) any exogenous state
10Fixing the debt ratio is analytically convenient but not necessary for our results since what matters
to the firm is the eﬀect of the unanticipated devaluation on the balance sheet conditional on the existing
debt structure. In addition, a stable foreign-denominated debt ratio is empirically justified: the firm-level
correlation between ωt and ωt−1 is greater than 0.9 in annual data. We also find no evidence to suggest
that in the year prior to the crisis, firms changed the currency composition of their debt owing to increased
anticipation of the devaluation.
11Only unanticipated movements in the exchange rate causes changes in the value of debt outstanding. The
UIP conditions guarantee that anticipated eﬀects are already built into the relevant risk free rate.
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variable that predicts an increase in profitability in the next period also reduces the external
finance premium. We consider the following functional form for x (·) :
x (k, b, z−1) =
bP
i=d,f φi (z) k
(11)
Normalizing the leverage ratio by the profit factor
P
i=d,f φi (z) insures that a firm whose
profits and debt are fully denominated in foreign currency does not experience a balance
sheet shock owing to an exchange rate movement.12 Under this specification, the external
finance premium is a function of the state variables when the debt instrument is issued, i.e.,
η0 = η (k0, b0, z) .
Because the function η is a strictly convex function of x, the slope of the premium rises more
rapidly as leverage increases.
Given the premium on external funds, firms may have an incentive to accumulate savings
and grow their way out of the financial constraint. To rule out this possibility, we introduce
a survival probability, μ. In steady-state, if μ = 1 and Λ is determined by the steady state
risk free rate, optimal leverage is indeterminate and the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies.
If μ < 1, the survival probability works as an additional discount factor and the firm holds a
positive amount of debt in the steady state. The appendix shows how the fixed cost parameter
and survival probability can be determined from the data.
The aggregate state variables [e, rd , Z] follow Markov processes which are specified to
match the macroeconomic environment during the crisis period. These processes allow for
interdependence between the domestic real interest rate and the exchange rate by assuming
that
r
0
d = f(rd, e, e−1) + ε
0
where ε0 may be interpreted as a shock to the country-risk premium. The form of f() is
determined by imposing uncovered interest parity, further details are provided in section 5.
Because the idiosyncratic shock to profitability, z, is assumed to be an iid random vari-
12We have also considered the specification x = b/
³P
i=d,f φi (z) k
γi + (1− δ)k
´
. The denominator of this
expression is profits plus undepreciated capital. Without adjustment costs, this variable represents net cash
available inside the firm. In this case, the premium function is simply an approximation to the cost of external
finance obtained in a one period debt contracting framework. With adjustment costs, the liquidation value
of the firm is more complex however, and there is no longer such a one-to-one mapping. Our formulation
preserves the intuition that an optimal debt contract implies a relationship between the cost of external
finance and leverage, while recognizing that, with adjustment costs, the value of capital in place depends on
the profitability of the firm.
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able13, the information contained in the vector [b, η (k, b, z−1) , z] can be summarized in a
single state variable, net worth, i.e.,
n ≡
ÃX
i=d,f
φi(z)k
γi − σ
!
+ (1− δ)k − Ω(e, e−1;ω)Rd(rd, η)b (12)
so that the value function may be defined as
v(k, n, z;ω) = max
k0,b0,d
½
(1 + λ) d+ μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z)v(k0, n0, z0;ω)Q(z, dz0)
¾
s.t. 12
In the above formulation, the vector, z depends only on the vector of aggregate state variables.
The asset pricing formula implied by the eﬃciency condition for b0 is given by
1
μ
=
Z
z0
µ
1 + λ0
1 + λ
¶
Λ(z0, z)
∙
Ω(e0, e;ω) (1 + r0d)
µ
1 + η0 +
∂η0
∂b0
b0
¶¸
Q(z, dz0) (13)
Owing to the survival probability μ, the marginal benefit from issuing new debt is greater
than one when evaluated at Λ(z0, z), the market’s discount rate.
Similarly, the eﬃciency condition for k0 implies the asset pricing formula
1 +
∂c
∂i
(i, k) = μ
Z
z0
µ
1 + λ0
1 + λ
¶
Λ(z0, z)
∙
∂d0
∂k0
+ (1− δ)
µ
1 +
∂c
∂i0
(i0, k0)
¶¸
Q(z, dz0) (14)
where the eﬀect of capital on next period’s dividend is given by
∂d0
∂k0
=
X
i=d,f
γiφi(z)k
0γi−1 − ∂c
∂k0
(i0, k0)− Ω (e0, e;ω) (1 + r0d)
∂η0
∂k0
b0.
Owing to the presence of financial market imperfections, the ratio of Lagrange multipliers
(1 + λ0) / (1 + λ) acts like an additional discount factor that influences the firm’s optimal
choices of debt and investment.
The model cannot be solved analytically, we therefore use Chebyshev projection methods
(Judd (1992)) to obtain a numerical approximation. Owing to the presence of occasionally
binding constraints, the solution approximates the conditional expectations of the model
first and then reconstructs the policy and the multiplier variables using the approximated
13The iid assumption avoids adding an additional state variable. The estimated autocorrelation of the
idiosyncratic shock to profits is on the order of 0.2~0.3, which is suﬃciently low to justify this assumption.
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conditional expectations following Wright and Williams (1982), den Haan and Marcet (1990)
and Christiano and Fisher (2000). Relative to Christiano and Fisher (2000), the solution
method is complicated by the fact that the model has two endogenous state variables, debt
and capital. Details of this method are described in the appendix.
To understand the basic mechanism at work in the model, consider the eﬀect on an
unanticipated devaluation. The devaluation causes an increase in the current debt obligation
and a reduction in net worth. The increased debt obligation raises the shadow value of internal
funds. The firm may respond by either reducing the dividend, increasing debt or cutting back
on investment. The firm decides on howmuch external finance to raise by equating the shadow
value of internal funds with the marginal cost of debt according to the eﬃciency condition for
new debt issuance. Simultaneously, the firm chooses its investment policy to equate the cost
of investment today relative to the benefit tomorrow where tomorrow’s benefit is evaluated at
the firm’s internal shadow value of funds. As a result, the unanticipated devaluation causes
an increase in the premium on external funds, a reduction in new debt issuance and a fall in
investment.
4 Regression Analysis.
This section formally assesses the role of foreign-denominated debt on investment spending
using a panel-data regression framework. The regressions reported in this section serve two
purposes: i) to assess the eﬀect of balance-sheet shocks on investment using a reduced-form
regression analysis and ii) to provide an empirical regression that can be used to estimate the
structural model parameters using indirect inference.
4.1 An Empirical Investment Equation
The empirical investment equation requires measures of investment fundamentals and the
balance sheet. Fundamentals are proxied for by the firm’s sales-to-capital ratio. This is con-
sistent with the assumption that firms face monopolistic competition and that the production
function is Cobb-Douglas in factor inputs. If producers have market power owing to monop-
olistic competition, firms may set diﬀerent markups in the domestic market relative to the
foreign market. As shown in the appendix, the marginal profitability of capital can then be
decomposed into a weighted average of the domestic sales-to-capital ratio and the exports-to-
capital ratio, where the relative weights depend on the degree of market power in each market.
The regression analysis includes both of these variables separately. This eﬀectively allows the
response of investment to fundamentals to diﬀer based on the source of profitability (foreign
12
versus domestic).
To measure the eﬀect of the exchange rate through the balance sheet we follow our model
and construct a proxy for Ωjtbjt/ajt. When constructing this proxy, we are careful to use only
exante information however. Let bjt denote the total debt of the firm at the beginning of the
period, denominated in local currency terms. Let ajt denote a measure of the beginning-of-
period value of total assets (again denominated in local currency terms). The ratio of debt
to assets bjt/ajt provides a measure of the balance sheet of the firm.14
To construct our measure of Ωjt we first measure the pre-crisis (1994-1996) sample mean
of each firm’s foreign debt ratio, i.e.,
ωˆj = 1/T
pc
j
X
(bf,j,t/bj,t)
where bf,j,t is the real foreign debt in domestic currency units and T
pc
j is the number of
nonmissing observations of firm j, during the pre-crisis period. Given ωˆj, the eﬀect of an
exchange rate movement on the value of debt can be measured as
Ωˆjt = 1− ωˆj + ωˆj (et/et−1) (15)
where et denotes the real exchange rate.15 If the real exchange rate is constant, Ωˆjt is equal
to unity for all firms. In periods when the exchange rate depreciates, et/et−1 rises and Ωˆjt
rises with the depreciation in proportion to the firm’s foreign-denominated debt share.
Movements in the balance sheet occur for one of two reasons, a rise in the overall level of
indebtedness bj,t/aj,t or an increase in the value of debt outstanding through changes in the
exchange rate variable Ωˆjt. Because bj,t/aj,t is measured at the beginning of the period, within-
period movements in Ωˆjt (bj,t/aj,t) are entirely attributable to movements in the exchange rate.
Because the foreign-denominated debt ratio is firm specific, such variation has firm-specific
eﬀects, causing a greater deterioration of the balance sheet for firms who rely relatively more
on foreign-denominated debt.
In addition to our measures of the balance sheet and fundamentals, the regression controls
for firm and time fixed eﬀects. Time dummies capture a common investment component owing
to macroeconomic influences working through either output or prices. Firm fixed eﬀects are
included to control for firm-level heterogeneity in the average investment rate of firms. Such
14We use assets rather than capital in place since the former controls for cash on hand and inventory stocks.
15In the model Ω(e, e−1;ω) depends on the innovation in the exchange rate rather than the ratio e/e−1 as
in equation 15. For our reduced-form analysis we use the latter formulation since it does not require us to
compute expectations. In our structural estimation, we estimate the auxilliary regression using the model’s
version of Ωjt so that simulated and actual regressions are correctly specified to match each other.
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heterogeneity may arise either because the mean level of fundamentals diﬀers, or the cost
of investing diﬀers across firms in some systematic way. Finally, for the sake of robustness,
the regressions also allow for serial correlation in the investment process by including lagged
investment on the right hand side of the regression.
Our empirical investment equation is
(i/k)j,t = c+ cj + ρ(i/k)j,t−1 +α0(s/k)j,t + β(Ωˆb/a)j,t + δt + j,t (16)
where (i/k)j,t is investment normalized by the tangible capital stock, (s/k)j,t is a vector
of domestic and foreign sales normalized by the tangible capital stock, [(sd/k)j,t (sf/k)j,t],
α = [αd αf ] is a vector of coeﬃcients measuring the eﬀect of fundamentals on investment, δt
is a time dummy and cj is the firm-specific fixed-eﬀect.
As a robustness check, we also estimate another version of the empirical investment
equation which considers separately the eﬀects of the devaluation given the average foreign-
denominated debt ratio and the beginning-of-period leverage ratio:
(i/k)j,t = c+ cj + ρ(i/k)j,t−1 +α0(s/k)j,t + βωˆj(et/et−1) + γ(b/a)j,t + δt + j,t (17)
This regression isolates the heterogenous eﬀect that the exchange rate has on firm-level in-
vestment owing to diﬀerences in firms’ pre-crisis foreign-denominated debt ratio.
In the absence of capital market imperfections, standard adjustment cost theory predicts
that β = γ = 0 under the assumption that (s/k)j,t properly measures fundamentals. In
general, fundamentals depend on the entire present discounted value of future profit rates. If
(s/k)j,t follows an AR1 process, then the present value (s/k)j,t is proportional to the current
value (s/k)j,t, and fundamentals are properly measured. If (s/k)j,t follows a richer stochastic
process, our proxy for fundamentals introduces measurement error into the equation however.
A frequent concern in the investment literature is that balance sheet measures may enter
investment equations significantly because the regression does not properly measure funda-
mentals. Firms in our data set that hold greater levels of foreign-denominated debt tend to
have higher ratios of exports to total sales. In the absence of financial frictions, an exchange
rate depreciation is more likely to be a positive shock to fundamentals for firms with high
foreign-denominated debt ratios. Thus, if fundamentals are measured with error, the estima-
tion procedure is biased against finding a negative eﬀect of the balance sheet working through
the exchange rate mechanism on investment.16
16Additional biases may occur owing to the following reasons: membership in conglomerates (Chaebol);
survivorship bias; and firm-specific imported material inputs. Firms that export are more likely to be members
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4.2 Econometric Methodology
To estimate equations 16 and 17, we consider two estimators: an IV version of a fixed-
eﬀect estimator and a panel-data GMM estimator. Instrumental variables control for the
endogeneity that may exist between current sales and current investment.17 The IV estimator
is a standard 2SLS estimator that controls for fixed eﬀects by removing group means. This
estimator is adopted in part for its simplicity. It controls for firm-level heterogeneity and
provides a reasonable summary of the data without applying complicated instruments sets
or weighting matrices. The IV estimator thus has the virtue that it is easy to apply when
estimating the structural model through indirect inference.
The IV estimator has some limitations for pure regression analysis however. In particular,
in the presence of lagged dependent variables, such estimators are inconsistent. We therefore
also consider the more general GMM panel-data estimation procedure proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991). This estimator uses first diﬀerences to eliminate the fixed eﬀect. First
diﬀerencing introduces serial correlation in the error term which can be controlled for through
the appropriate choice of instruments.
After taking first diﬀerences, equation 16 may be expressed as
∆(i/k)j,t = ρ∆(i/k)j,t−1 +α0∆(s/k)j,t + β∆(Ωˆb/a)j,t + δt + vj,t (18)
vj,t = j,t − j,t−1
Since the sales variables are treated as endogenous and the lagged dependent variable,∆(i/k)j,t−1
is correlated with the error term, vj,t = j,t − j,t−1, by construction, (i/k)j,t−s and (s/k)j,t−s
are valid instruments for s ≥ 2. The balance-sheet variable is treated as a predetermined vari-
able and therefore, (Ωˆb/a)j,t−s are valid instruments for s ≥ 1. We use the two-step version
of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator where the residuals of the first-step estimation
are used to construct the optimal weighting matrix for the second-step estimator. We also
of industrial groups that provide partial insurance through cross-firm financial arrangements. Such insurance
may mitigate the eﬀect of the individual firm’s balance sheet on investment. Although the firm-specific
fixed factor partially controls for such diﬀerences, by omitting specific controls for the balance sheets of the
conglomerate, our estimates would understate the strength of financial frictions. Similarly, by confining our
attention to a balanced panel, our estimates may display survivorship bias which also biases the eﬀect of the
balance sheet to zero. Because imported material shares may be positively correlated with export status,
mismeasurement of this share would produce bias in the oppositie direction however, i.e. the foreign debt
ratio may proxy for the imported materials share. To control for this possibility, we use the ratio of foreign-
denominated trade payables to total trade payables as a proxy for this share. Adding this variable to the
regression does not change our coeﬃcient estimates for β or γ.
17The IV estimator using lagged sales as an instrument controls for simultaneity bias between current sales
and current investment, in the event that time to build is less than one year.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean
(i/k)j,t 0.169 0.244 0.230 0.136
(s/k)j,t 3.756 3.195 3.939 3.657
(π/k)j,t 0.764 0.866 0.785 0.753
(b/a)j,t 0.371 0.211 0.392 0.363¡
sf/s
¢
j,t 0.284 0.279 0.251 0.307¡
bf/b
¢
j,t 0.140 0.189 0.140 0.140
corr (se/s, be/b) 0.1669 0.251 0.120
provide the results of overidentifying restriction tests in the tables. For the fixed-eﬀect IV
estimator, we use (s/k)j,t−s for s ≥ 1 and (Ωˆb/a)j,t−s for s ≥ 1 as instruments. When es-
timating equation 17 which considers the separate eﬀects of Ωˆjt and b/aj,t−s, we use lags of
Ωˆj,t−s and b/aj,t−s as separate instruments in both the IV fixed-eﬀect estimator and the GMM
estimator.
4.3 Data
Our data set is a unique, proprietary data set of Korean manufacturing firms. The data set is
provided by KIS (Korea Information System). It provides income-statement and balance sheet
data for all listed manufacturing companies over the period 1993 to 2002. Unlike Compustat
data, the standard data set used for U.S. firm-level investment studies, the KIS data provide
distinct information on the value of foreign versus domestically denominated debt, and foreign
versus domestic sales.
Table 1 provides summary statistics, constructed for the full sample, and before and
after the onset of the crisis. The mean rate of investment fell from 23 percent pre-crisis to
13.6 percent post-crisis. Exports as a fraction of total sales rose form 25 percent pre-crisis
to 30.7 percent post-crisis while overall profitability and overall sales fell slightly during the
post-crisis period. These numbers are consistent with the figures displayed above. The last
row of Table 1 provides information on the correlation between foreign exchange earnings
and foreign-denominated debt. The correlation is 0.17 over the entire sample period, and
somewhat higher than that during the pre-crisis period (0.25). Thus, firms who access foreign-
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Table 2: Quartile Distribution of Pre-Crisis Firm Means
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% mean
(b/a)j 0.000 0.261 0.399 0.504 1.632 0.391¡
sf/s
¢
j 0.000 0.034 0.158 0.419 0.983 0.255¡
bf/b
¢
j 0.000 0.024 0.081 0.185 1.000 0.141
Table 3: Determinants of Foreign-Debt Ratio
sf/s b/a log(a) R2
Pre-Crisis: 0.154 -0.276 0.017 0.15
(0.028) (0.044) (0.006)
Full-Sample: 0.124 -0.182 0.038 0.10
(0.026) (0.039) (0.029)
denominated debt markets are more likely to be export-oriented firms.
Table 2 provides information on the quantile distribution of firms’s pre-crisis averages of
export-sales ratios, leverage ratios and foreign-denominated debt ratios. This information is
explicitly used to calculate a distribution of firm types embedded in the structural estimation
described below. The median firm in the sample has an export/sales ratio of 15 percent
while nearly 25 percent of the firms have almost no exports. Likewise, the median firm
in the sample has a foreign-denominated debt ratio of eight percent. Importantly, there is
considerable variation in the foreign-denominated debt ratio, the variable that determines the
extent to which the devaluation has heterogeneous eﬀects across firms through the balance
sheet.
To complete our summary statistics, Table 3 considers the determinants of foreign-
denominated debt. This table reports results from a regression of ωj, the foreign-denominated
debt ratio on the export-sales ratio (sf/s), the debt-to-asset ratio (b/a), and the log of assets,
log(a) as a proxy for firm size. All variables are computed as firm-specific means. In the first
regression, these means are computed over the pre-crisis period. In the second regression we
compute the means using the full sample.
Table 3 highlights the finding that firms with high foreign-denominated debt ratios are
firms who have a higher propensity to export. Such firms also tend to have stronger balance
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sheets as measured by the debt-to-asset ratio. Finally, the data show a modest size eﬀect —
controlling for exports and leverage, firms with high levels of foreign-denominated debt tend
to be larger firms. The non-randomness in foreign-denominated debt ratios justifies explicitly
controlling for firm factors through fixed eﬀects in our reduced-form investment regression. It
also motivates our firm-specific controls used in the structural estimation.
4.4 Estimation Results
Table 4 summarizes the main empirical findings using both IV fixed eﬀects and the first-
diﬀerenced GMM specification.18 The first column of estimates reported in Table 4 include
the sales-to-capital ratios (both domestic and foreign) along with the balance sheet variable
(Ωˆb/a)j,t. Fundamentals, as measured by the sales-to-capital ratios, have a statistically signif-
icant positive eﬀect on investment. The coeﬃcient on the balance-sheet variable is negative
and highly statistically significant. At the mean value of the foreign-denominated debt and
leverage ratios (ωj = 0.14, b/a = 0.4), the estimated coeﬃcient on (Ωˆb/a)j,t suggests that the
70% devaluation reduces the investment rate by 60 basis points through the balance sheet
mechanism. This mechanism can thus account for only a small fraction of the 10 percentage
point reduction in the rate of investment that occurred during the crisis.
The second column of table 4, decompose the balance-sheet eﬀect into two terms —
the beginning-of-period debt-level (b/a)j,t and the exchange rate interacted with the pre-
sample foreign-denominated debt ratio ωˆjet. Because the regression includes a full set of time
dummies, the coeﬃcient on ωˆjet captures the heterogenous eﬀect of the exchange rate on
investment owing to the fact that firms face diﬀerent degrees of foreign-debt exposure at the
onset of the crisis. Both balance sheet variables are negative, statistically significant, and
quantitatively large.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 report the GMM estimates based on first-
diﬀerencing. These estimates include the lagged dependent variable for robustness. The
coeﬃcient estimates on the balance sheet variables are again negative, quantitatively large
and statistically significant. When the balance sheet is split into its two components (column
4) we again find an independent eﬀect of the exchange rate interacted with the pre-sample
foreign-denominated debt ratio. In all regressions, the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent
18Our structural estimation reported below is conducted with a balanced panel of firms. Accordingly, we
confine our attention to the balanced panel when reporting reduced form estimation results though we have
estimated all regressions using both the balanced and unbalanced panels. We find little diﬀerence between
these estimates — the coeﬃcient on the balance-sheet variable is slightly smaller for the balanced panel, which
is consistent with the notion that selection induced by the balanced-panel biases our estimates towards higher
quality firms with less severe financial frictions.
18
Table 4: Investment Equation
IV Fixed Eﬀects First Diﬀ. GMM
(i/k)j,t (i/k)j,t (i/k)j,t (i/k)j,t
(sd/k)j,t 0.069 0.069 0.054 0.051
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022)
(se/k)j,t 0.047 0.047 0.035 0.035
(0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
(Ωˆb/a)j,t -0.208 — -0.177 —
(0.037) (0.041)
(b/a)j,t — -0.194 — -0.160
(0.038) (0.049)
ωˆjet — -0.503 — -0.205
(0.124) (0.074)
(i/k)j,t−1 — — 0.204 0.201
(0.018) (0.022)
Rsq (within) 0.19 0.20 — —
Sargan — — 106.34 105.89
(p-val) — — (0.39) (0.17)
m2 — — -0.22 -0.29
(p-val) — — (0.83) (0.77)
No. of Obs. 2490 2490 1990 1990
No of Inds. 419 419 412 412
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variable is statistically significant though relatively small in magnitude.
In table five, the devaluation is allowed to have non-linear eﬀects which depend on the
firm’s pre-crisis export and foreign-denominated debt position. To do so, the sample is divided
into four sub-groups based on whether firms are high vs. low export-sales ratios and high vs.
low foreign-denominated debt ratios. These classifications are based on the median pre-crisis
averages of export-sales and foreign-denominated debt ratios. For parsimony, only the GMM
estimates are reported.
Table 5: Investment Equation
First Diﬀerenced GMM by sub-groups
H-fob/L Exp H-fob/H-exp L-Fob/L-exp L-Fob/H-exp
(i/k)j,t (i/k)j,t (i/k)j,t (i/k)j,t
(sd/k)j,t 0.060 0.082 0.041 0.058
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
(se/k)j,t 0.028 0.064 0.150 0.041
(0.001) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003)
(Ωˆb/a)j,t -0.406 -0.203 -0.197 -0.021
(0.023) (0.019) (0.026) (0.013)
(i/k)j,t−1 0.145 0.148 0.130 0.149
(0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009)
Sargan 57.13 100.28 88.91 58.97
(0.99) (0.56) (0.84) (0.99)
m2 -0.63 -0.99 0.51 -0.94
(0.53) (0.32) (0.61) (0.35)
No of Obs. 349 640 686 315
No of Inds. 70 137 136 69
Firms who are most vulnerable to the exchange rate shock — firms with low exports and
high foreign-denominated debt — exhibit the greatest sensitivity of investment to the balance
sheet variable. The coeﬃcient on the balance sheet is -0.401 and highly significant. Firms
who are least vulnerable — firms with high exports and low foreign-denominated debt ratios
exhibit essentially no response of investment to the balance sheet. As expected, the other
two categories, low foreign-denominated debt/high exports and high foreign-denominated
debt/low exports, exhibit responses that are between these extremes.
In summary, the response of investment to the exchange rate devaluation is consistent
with the notion that credit frictions working through the balance sheet were a determining
20
factor. The devaluation depressed investment for firms whose financial position was most
exposed to exchange rate shocks. In particular, the balance sheet mechanism is strongest for
firms with a significant currency mismatch between export exposure and debt exposure.
5 Structural Estimation
Structural estimation proceeds in two stages. The first stage derives a parametric form of
the profit function and applies conventional panel-data econometric techniques to identify
relevant structural parameters. It also determines the forcing processes for the macroeconomic
variables. The parameters of these forcing processes determine future expectations. The
second stage uses indirect inference to estimate the structural parameters that determine
adjustment costs and financial frictions. The estimated structural parameters are then used
to evaluate the role that financial factors and foreign-denominated debt play in propagating
the financial crisis through investment spending.
When identifying the role of foreign-denominated debt on investment, the estimation
procedure recognizes that firms that issue foreign-denominated debt are non-representative. In
particular, such firms often issue foreign-denominated debt to hedge against foreign earnings
and are thus more likely to be exporters than other firms. To allow for this possibility, the
structural estimation explicitly accounts for firm-level heterogeneity observed in the data.
In particular, the estimation strategy conditions on the underlying distribution of export
composition, foreign-denominated debt ratios and leverage.
5.1 Production Technology, Market Structure and Profitability
To derive a closed-form profit function, firm j is assumed to produce two diﬀerentiated goods
— domestic and foreign — with a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology. Although
the firm produces two diﬀerentiated goods, it employs only one type of capital, kj,t and the
production processes of both goods are subject to the same iid productivity shock. The
production technology also allows for both domestic variable inputs such as labor and foreign
variable inputs such as imported materials. In this framework, a firm with a given level
of technology and capital chooses how to allocate variable inputs across the domestic and
foreign markets to maximize profits. The firm faces monopolistic competition in both markets.
Demand is assumed to be iso-elastic demand and the demand elasticities are allowed to diﬀer
across the domestic and foreign markets.
Under these assumptions, the closed-form profit function of a firm can be expressed as a
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weighted average of sales in each market
πj,t =
X
i=d,f
φi,j(zt)k
γi
j,t − σj
=
X
i=d,f
Γisi,j,t − σj (19)
where the weights are determined by the mark-up 1/χi in each market combined with the
production share of capital vα:
Γi = 1− χi(1− να). (20)
Because the profit function and the sales function are identical up to a scaler, Γi, the
structural parameters of the profit function can be identified by estimating distinct sales equa-
tions for the domestic and foreign markets.19 By maximizing over the variable factor inputs,
sales in each market may be expressed as a log-linear function of a fixed firm factor θi,j, the
individual firm’s capital kjt, the exchange rate et, a common (aggregate) demand compo-
nent yit and an idiosyncratic error vj,t. For estimation purposes, we allow the idiosyncratic
error to follow an AR1 process, in which case we obtain the following fixed-eﬀect regression
specification with AR(1) error term, developed by Baltagi and Wu (1999) and Baltagi (2000),
ln si,j,t = ς i ln θi,j + γi ln kj,t + ξi ln et + αi ln yi,t + vj,t (21)
vj,t = ρvvj,t−1 + uj,t, uj,t ∼ iid N(0, σ2u)
for i = d, f . The elasticities of sales with respect to capital in equation 21 provide estimates
of the implied markups in the domestic and foreign markets through the relationship
γi =
ναχi
1− χi(1− να)
.
To estimate the sales equations, all variables are expressed as real quantity values deflated
by appropriate price indices. The domestic demand shifter yd,t is the HP-detrended Korean
log-GDP. The foreign demand shifter yf,t is the HP-detrended index of world income obtained
from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) data base obtained from the IMF.
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the profit function. The coeﬃcient estimates for
γi, the elasticity of sales with respect to capital, are significant and in line with other estimates
obtained in the literature. Using an estimate of the production share of capital vα = 0.225,
19Separate accounting data are available for domestic and foreign sales but not earnings.
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Table 6: Profit Function: Export vs Domestic Sales
log et log kj,t log ad,t log af,t rhov R2 Obs/Inds
log sf,t 0.360 0.545 — 5.355 0.325 0.41 2544
(0.086) (0.038) — (1.76) 416
log sd,t -0.120 0.412 1.479 — 0.223 0.62 2847
(0.052) (0.024) (0.198) — 441
the implied mark-ups are moderate and somewhat stronger in the domestic market (1.32)
than in the foreign market (1.18).20
The estimated exchange rate coeﬃcients indicate that domestic sales respond negatively
to an exchange rate devaluation (ξˆd = −0.12) while exports respond positively to the deval-
uation (ξˆf = 0.36). The negative response of domestic sales is consistent with the reliance
of domestic sales on foreign inputs. These estimates also imply a threshold value for the
export-sales ratio, 0.25, above which a firm’s profit is increasing in the real exchange rate.21
This threshold value is greater than the median export-sales ratio(0.203) and smaller than
the mean export-sales ratio(0.284) in the sample. Thus, on average, movements in the real
exchange rate do not exert a strong influence on competitiveness in the Korean manufacturing
sector.
Given a firm’s state variables [kj,t, et, yd,t, yf,t], the elasticities [γi, ξi, αi] combined with
the estimates of the idiosyncratic forcing process [ρv, σ2u] are suﬃcient to characterize the sales
process in each market. To reconstruct the profit function we also need the weights Γi, an
estimate of the fixed cost σj, and a methodology to determine the firm-specific productivity
factors θi,j. The weights Γi are determined directly from equation 20. The fixed cost σj is
assumed to be proportional to the steady-state value of sales for firm j. The fixed cost may
then be estimated as a fraction of sales using the average overhead costs to sales ratio reported
in the data. Under this formulation, one may define an appropriate normalizing factor to
render the firm problem scale invariant. The ratio of exports to total sales determines the
relative productivity of exports and hence the ratio θf,j/θd,j. The productivity levels θf,j and
20The choice of vα allows us to infer an implied markup consistent with the curvature estimates γi. Setting
vα = 0.225 is consistent with the profit to sales ratio observed in the data given our estimate of fixed costs.
This choice is also roughly consistent with estimates provided by Kim and Park (2000) and Park (1999).
21The elasticity of gross profits with respect to the exchange rate may be approximated by
¡
1− ζf,j
¢
ξˆd +
ζf,j ξˆf where ζf,j denotes the export to total sales ratio.
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θd,j relate to the steady-state size of the firm and are determined by the normalizing factor.
The appendix provides further details of these steady-state calculations.
5.2 Macroeconomic Shock Processes
To specify a stochastic process for the real interest rate, we decompose the domestic risk free
rate into subcomponents
1 + rd = (1 + rf)E (e/e−1|z−1) (22)
= (1 + r¯) (1 + ξ)E (e/e−1|z−1)
where 1 + rf is the risk free rate on foreign bonds which has two components, the foreign
interest rate, r¯, which we take as a constant, and the country risk premium, ξ.22 The exchange
rate is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with persistence parameter ρ. The country risk
premium is specified as an AR(1) process in logs, i.e., ξ = ξ¯1−ϕ exp(ε)ξϕ−1, where ξ¯ is the
normal level of the country risk premium.
In log deviations, equation 22 implies
rd = r¯ + (ρ− 1) log e−1 + ξ.
Substituting the data generating process for the country risk premium:
rd = r¯ + (ρ− 1) log e−1 + ξ¯ (1− ϕ) + ϕξ−1 + ε.
Lagging this equation one period and solving for ξ−1, we have:
rd = (1− ϕ)
¡
r¯ + ξ¯
¢
+ (ρ− 1) (log e−1 − ϕ log e−2) + ϕrd−1 + ε. (23)
Equation 23 implies the following time-series model for the real interest rate is
rd = a1 + a2 log e−1 + a3 log e−2 + a4rd−1 + ε (24)
where a1 ≡ (1− ϕ) r¯, a2 ≡ (ρ− 1), a3 ≡ −ϕ (ρ− 1), and a4 = ϕ.
OLS estimates for the exchange rate process over the pre-crisis period 1966-1997 imply
ρˆ = 0.804, while estimates over the period 1966-2002 with a crisis dummy included imply
22One can think of r¯ as the real US Treasury Bond rate and ξ as the spread on the emerging market
government bond. To construct the real interest rate data, we use an inflation forecast based on AR(1)
process.
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Table 7: Interest Rate Process
a1 a2 a3 a4 1(t = 1998)
MLE (1966-2002)
Estimate
std errors
OLS (1966-2002)
Estimate
std errors
0.042 −0.118 −0.049 0.665 0.018
(0.016) (0.063) (0.024) (0.312) (0.402)
0.015 −0.136 0.035 0.560 0.015
(0.010) (0.023) (0.040) (0.196) (0.015)
ρˆ = 0.89. If the UIP condition holds, the persistence parameter estimated from the exchange
rate process, ρˆ must be closed to 1 + aˆ2. Also, aˆ3 must be close to −aˆ4 (ρˆ− 1). Under UIP,
aˆ1/(1− aˆ4) may be interpreted as the real interest rate in the foreign country plus the normal
level of country risk premium.
Table 7 provides estimation results for equation 24. It reports both OLS and MLE
estimates and include a crisis dummy, though estimation results for the interest rate process
are not particular sensitive to the inclusion of this variable. Given a persistence parameter
for the real exchange rate, ρˆ, between 0.8 to 0.89, aˆ2 should range between -0.1 to -0.19. The
actual estimates fall within this range.23 The coeﬃcient a4 measures the degree of persistence
in the country-risk premium. The estimates vary between 0.56 and 0.665. Finally, estimation
results imply a long-run real interest rate of 3% to 12% depending on the specification.
Based on these values, we set the steady-state risk-free rate rd = 5%, the degree of
persistence for the country risk premium ϕ = 0.6, and choose ρ = 0.85 as our baseline estimate
for the degree of persistence in the exchange rate process. Estimation and simulation results
are highly robust to reasonable variation in the choice of the steady-state risk free rate and
the degree of persistence in the country-risk premium. Because the degree of persistence in
the exchange rate process plays a key role in the dynamics of the expected future interest rate
path under UIP, we examine the robustness of structural estimation and model simulation
results to this parameter however.
In addition to the exchange rate and interest rate process, our model requires us to specify
a stochastic process for the aggregate demand shifter in the sales equation. These shifters
include Korean real GDP for domestic sales and World GDP for foreign sales. Estimating an
AR1 process for the HP-detrended log of domestic GDP over the 1990-1997 sample period
23Using pre-crisis data, the persistence parameter is estimated to be 0.801. Using the full-sample combined
with a dummy variable for the crisis year, the persistence parameter is estimated to be 0.897.
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implies ρA = 0.7.24 Because world output shows only small variation over this period, it is
assumed to be fixed at a constant value.
5.3 Indirect Inference
This section applies indirect inference to estimate the two structural parameters of the model
that govern the investment process, one for the capital adjustment cost and the other for the
agency cost, κ. The adjustment cost function is specified as
c(i, k) =
ψ
2
µ
i
k
− δ
¶2
k.
The agency cost function is specified as
κ [exp (x)− 1]
where x is a measure for the firm’s financial burden properly normalized by firm assets, namely
the leverage ratio defined in equation 11. Under the null hypothesis of no financial market
frictions, the estimated value of κ should be close to zero.
Indirect inference uses a criterion function derived from an auxiliary statistical model
which may be estimated from both the actual data and the simulated data obtained from the
structural model. The structural parameter vector θ = [ψ, θ]0 is chosen so that the auxiliary
model’s parameter estimates obtained from the simulated data are close to the parameter
estimates obtained from the actual data.
Denote the criterion function for the auxiliary model applied to the real data by Q. The
estimate of the auxiliary model can be defined as
βˆ = argmax
β
QT (xT ;β)
where xT is a data matrix and T is the number of observations. In the case of panel data, T
implies the product of the number of time observations and the number of individuals. Fol-
lowing Gourieroux and Monfort (1996), define the binding function, β = b(θ) as a simulated
counterpart of βˆ, i.e., a solution to Eθ [∂Q(x; b (θ))/∂b(θ)] = 0. In actual estimation, the
24Estimating the Korean GDP process for 1970-2002 gives an implied persistence ρA = 0.3 which is ex-
tremely low for the detrended log-level of GDP. Nonetheless, setting ρA = 0.3 provides structural parameter
estimates that are very close to those obtained when setting ρA = 0.7.
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binding function is replaced by its empirical counterpart,
bˆS(θ) =
1
S
SX
s=1
βˆ
(s)
T (θ)
where S is the number of simulations. The minimum distance estimator of the structural
parameter vector, θ, is defined as
θˆ
S
MD = argmin
h
βˆ − bˆS(θ)
i0
W
h
βˆ − bˆS(θ)
i
whereW is a positive-definite matrix. As the sample size goes to infinity, the indirect inference
estimator θˆ
S
MD is consistent and asymptotically normal for any fixed S. The asymptotically
optimal weighting matrix is
W0 = A0B−10 A0
where
A0 = lim
T−→∞
E{∂2Q(x;β)/∂β0∂β00}
and
I0 = lim
T−→∞
var{
√
T∂Q(x; ∂β)/∂β0 −E[
√
T∂Q(x; ∂β)/∂β0|x]}.
With this choice of the weighting matrix, the asymptotic distribution of the indirect inference
estimator satisfies √
T (θˆ
S
MD − θ0)
d−→ N(0, avar(θˆSMD))
where avar(θˆ
S
MD) = (1 + 1/S)[∂b(θ0)/∂θW0∂b(θ0)/∂θ
0]−1
The asymptotic eﬃciency of the estimator depends on how well the auxiliary model cap-
tures the properties of the original structural model. In our case, the auxiliary model should
reflect two fundamental aspects, namely the influences of both the investment fundamentals
and the financial frictions, controlling for important individual characteristics. The reduced-
form regression used in section 4,
(i/k)j,t = cj + βd(sd/k)j,t + βf(sf/k)j,t + βfd(Ωˆb/a)j,t + δt + εj,t,
is well suited for these requirements. The sales-to-capital ratios and the balance-sheet term
control for fundamentals and financial conditions in a parsimonious way, while the fixed-eﬀect
allows for heterogeneity in investment rates across firms that may be correlated with either
profitability or financial factors.25
25When matching the model to the data, we assume that total assets in the model are equal to current
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When generating the simulated data used to estimate the structural model, we also wish
to control for firm-level heterogeneity. To do so in a model consistent manner, we specify a
firm-specific vector of individual characteristics, hj. The vector hj measures the firm-specific
steady-state values of the foreign-denominated debt ratio and the export-sales ratio. The
export-sales ratio may me mapped into the firm-specific structural parameters that determine
the relative productivity of exports θf/θd. These firm-specific ratios are estimated using pre-
crisis sample means. The dynamic programming problem of each individual in the simulation
stage is then a function of this individual characteristics vector, hj. Firms are also allowed
to diﬀer in their initial debt to capital or leverage ratios. While these diﬀerences do not
aﬀect the model solution, they are relevant when simulating the data for estimation purposes.
In summary, individual firms are characterized by a vector, hj = [ωj, θf/θd, (b/k)j] which is
predetermined at the onset of the crisis.
The distributions of these individual characteristics are nondegenerate and chosen to
replicate the distributions observed in the data prior to the onset of the financial crisis. The
realized paths of the exchange rate, the country-risk premium and the macroeconomic shock
are chosen to match the actual aggregate realizations on an annual basis. Table 11 in the
appendix summarizes these variables.
The simulated panel data has the same number of time observations for each individual.
Since we do not model exit behavior, the panel is balanced in both the simulated data and
the actual data. For variance reduction, we compute S = 100 simulations. In other words,
bˆS(θ) is an average of 100 IV Fixed Eﬀect estimates.
Ideally, to completely control for firm-level heterogeneity, one would solve the value func-
tion and simulate the data for each firm in our sample. Because the data contain over 400
individual firms, it is a computationally formidable task to generate a simulated panel with
the same number of individuals as the data however. To reduce the computational burden,
our estimation procedure creates a simulated panel with a smaller number of individuals, but
which replicates the distributions of individual characteristics in the data. This is done in
the following way: i) Estimate the joint empirical distribution function for the three individ-
ual characteristics describe above. Since we rely on the quartile distribution, this procedure
generates a panel with 43 = 64 individuals. ii) Numerically solve the value function for the
sixteen types (42) characterized by the quartiles of the distribution for ωj and θf/θd. iii) For
each of these sixteen model solutions, simulate the model for four separate initial leverage
positions (b/k)j. This procedure generates 64 time series for each simulation. iv) Apply a
weighted average version of an IV Fixed Eﬀect estimator to the simulated data. The weights
profits plus undepreciated capital, i.e. a =
P
i=d,f φi(z−1)k
γi + (1− δ)k.
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are determined by the empirical probability of observing each of the 64 types. This proce-
dure assumes that the data is well approximated by 64 individual types characterized by the
individual characteristics described above. By relying on the joint empirical distribution to
weight these types, our estimation procedure eﬀectively controls for the fact that a firm who
is a high foreign-debt type is also more likely to be a high export type in our estimation
strategy.26
This procedure is used to estimate two structural parameters using three moments,
namely, [βˆ
d − bˆdS(θ), βˆ
f − bˆfS(θ), βˆ
f − bˆfdS (θ)]. Consequently, the system is overidentified,
and the choice of the weighting matrix matters for our estimates. The optimal weighting
matrix is the inverse of variance-covariance matrix of the auxiliary parameter estimates in
the real data, i.e. Wˆ = [T Vˆ (βˆ)]−1. This is the optimal weighting matrix under the null
hypothesis that the model is correct. Because the system is over-identified, the minimized
distance follows a chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom 1 and therefore provides
the following Sargan test statistic of overidentifying restrictions:
J(θˆ) =
TS
1 + S
h
βˆ − bˆS(θˆ)
i0
Wˆ
h
βˆ − bˆS(θˆ)
i
∼ χ2(1).
5.4 Structural Estimation Results
We now report parameter estimates obtained from our indirect inference procedure. Because
counterfactual simulations are sensitive to the assumptions made regarding both the persis-
tence of the exchange rate process and the choice of the household discount factor Λ(z0, z), the
estimation procedure considers four distinct macroeconomic environments. These alternative
parameter estimates are considered for robustness. In particular, although time eﬀects are re-
moved from both the model and the data when matching moments, structural estimates may
be sensitive to the specification of the macroeconomic environment owing to nonlinearities
inherent to the structural model. Also, model simulations consider alternative but plausible
assumptions regarding agents’ expectations of the macroeconomic processes.
The first three estimates assume that the firm discounts future profits using the domestic
interest rate
Λ(z0, z) =
β
1 + rd
26An early version of this paper assumed that firms are heterogeneous in their steady-state leverage positions
owing to diﬀerential access to capital markets. This can be motivated by allowing the survival probability
μ to be heterogenous across firms. This assumption requires one to solve the value function separately for 64
types rather than sixteen which implies a four-fold increase in computational costs. Because this dimension
of heterogeneity made very little diﬀerence in our estimation results, we adopted the simplifying assumption
that all firms have the same long-run access to capital markets but diﬀer in their initial leverage positions.
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Table 8: Auxilliary Parameter Estimates
(sd/k)jt (se/k)jt (Ωˆb/a)jt
Data Moments
Simulated Moments
1. Λ(zt+1, zt) = (1 + rt+1)−1
ρe = 0.85
ρe = 0.90
ρe = 0.95
2. Λ(zt+1, zt) = β (Ct+1/Ct)
−1
ρe = 0.85
0.0692 0.0465 −0.2075
0.0689 0.0464 −0.2060
0.0687 0.0468 −0.2006
0.0683 0.0405 −0.1931
0.0648 0.0422 −0.1850
The degree of persistence in the real exchange rate is then allowed to vary: ρ = 0.85, 0.9, 0.95.
By imposing uncovered interest parity, the persistence of the real exchange rate process in-
fluences firms’ beliefs regarding the expected future interest rate path for a given degree of
persistence in the country-risk premium.
Imposing UIP is a strong assumption however. Therefore, the model is also estimated
under the assumption that households have log-utility and the firm discounts future profits
using the household discount factor:
Λ(z0, z) = β
Ct
Ct+1
Using the household discount factor avoids imposing uncovered interest rate parity. To avoid
adding an additional state variable, Ct is assumed to move one for one with the (HP-filtered)
Korean real GDP which is already included as a state variable in the model.
Table 8 reports the auxiliary regression coeﬃcients obtained from both the model and the
data. For all four estimates, the model successfully matches the auxiliary coeﬃcients obtained
from the IV fixed eﬀect regression in the data. Let the case Λ(z0, z) = β
1+rd
and ρ = 0.85 denote
the baseline case. In this case, the coeﬃcients for the domestic and foreign sales to capital
ratios obtained from the model are 0.0689 and 0.0464. The coeﬃcients obtained from the data
are 0.0692 and 0.0456. The model does an equally successful job matching the coeﬃcient on
the balance sheet variable – (-0.2060) in the model versus (-0.2075) in the data. The other
cases considered provide only slight diﬀerences in the estimates for the auxiliary coeﬃcients.
Table 9 reports the structural parameters obtained from this estimation procedure, along
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Table 9: Estimates of Structural Parameters
ψˆ κˆ Jˆ
(s.e) (s.e) (p− val.)
1. Λ(zt+1, zt) = (1 + rt+1)−1
ρe = 0.85
ρe = 0.90
ρe = 0.95
2. Λ(zt+1, zt) = β (Ct+1/Ct)
−1
ρe = 0.85
0.9530 0.1443 0.0042
(0.0497) (0.0395) (0.9483)
0.9569 0.1355 0.0442
(0.0762) (0.0220) (0.8335)
1.0670 0.1429 0.6544
(0.1740) (0.0116) (0.4185)
1.0066 0.1284 0.5388
(0.0314) (0.0139) (0.4629)
with the test of over-identifying restrictions. For the baseline case, the adjustment cost
parameter is estimated to be 0.9530 with a standard error of 0.0497. This estimate is similar to
the structural estimates reported in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) and Eberly et al. (2007).
It is also much lower than what one would obtain using a Tobin’s Q-style regression framework.
Varying the degree of persistence in the exchange rate process, we obtain parameter estimates
of the adjustment cost coeﬃcient that vary between 0.9530 and 1.067.
The structural coeﬃcients imply an important role for financial market imperfections
in the investment process. For the baseline case, the coeﬃcient measuring agency costs, κ,
is estimated to be 0.1443 and highly significant. The model therefore clearly rejects the
null hypothesis of no financial market imperfections. Across the four parameterizations, the
estimated value of κ varies between 0.1284 and 0.1443. Roughly speaking, these estimates
imply that if leverage doubles, the cost of external finance rises by ten percentage points.
Finally, Table 9 also reports the J-statistics for the over-identifying restriction. According
to this J-statistic, one cannot reject the model’s over-identifying restriction for any of the four
estimates provided.
Table 10 verifies that the model’s structural parameters are well identified by the auxiliary
regression that we match. Identification requires that the loss function is well behaved and
varies systematically with the structural parameter estimates. In the top panel of table 10, we
fix the value for κ at its estimated value and vary the adjustment cost coeﬃcient, while in the
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Table 10: The eﬀects of conditional variations in the structural parameters
(sd/k)jt (se/k)jt (Ωˆb/a)jt Jˆ
κ = 0.1443
ψ = 0.6000
ψ = 0.8000
ψ = 0.9530
ψ = 1.0000
ψ = 1.2000
ψ = 1.4000
ψ = 0.9530
κ = 0.0700
κ = 0.1000
κ = 0.1300
κ = 0.1443
κ = 0.1480
κ = 0.1500
0.0904 0.0918 −0.3412 62.180
0.0680 0.0743 −0.2683 11.355
0.0689 0.0464 −0.2060 0.004
0.0831 0.0130 −0.1763 13.003
0.0710 0.0325 −0.0989 11.715
0.0769 0.0391 0.0127 37.319
0.0274 0.0249 −0.1662 61.8962
0.0503 0.0111 −0.2064 27.1192
0.0624 0.0278 −0.2237 5.432
0.0689 0.0464 −0.2060 0.004
0.0257 0.0995 −0.3345 67.093
−0.0049 0.1402 −0.4144 196.491
bottom panel, we fix ψ at its estimated value and vary κ. In both cases, substantial deviations
from the estimated parameter values imply large increases in the loss function. Importantly,
the model implies a strong relationship between the severity of financial frictions (higher κ)
and the response of investment to the balance sheet variable.
5.5 Model Simulations
We first consider the eﬀect of the financial crisis — the exchange rate devaluation combined
with the fall in domestic GDP and the rise in the country risk premium — on firm-level
investment. We then consider the aggregate implications of the financial crisis given our
structural estimates.
Figure 3 plots the eﬀect of the devaluation combined with rising interest rates and falling
output on investment for firms whose export share is at the midpoint in the first quartile of
the distribution and whose foreign-denominated debt share is at the midpoint in the fourth
quartile of the distribution. Results are reported for varying degrees of balance sheet exposure
as measured by firm leverage ratios. The leverage ratios vary from the highest quartile (solid
line) to the lowest quartile (dotted line).
For firms with low exports and high foreign-denominated debt ratios, the devaluation
combined with the macroeconomic shocks implies a reduction in sales and investment. It also
32
0 5 10 15 20
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
I/K
0 5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
S/K
0 5 10 15 20
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0 5 10 15 20
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Shadow Value
Figure 3: Investment Response: Low Export, High Foreign Debt.
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Figure 4: Investment Response: High Export, Low Foreign Debt.
implies an increase in the cost of external funds that varies between one to ten percentage
points. The overall spread between Korean corporate bonds and government bonds rose by
9% during this period. Thus, model estimates imply relatively conservative movements in the
premium on external finance. The rise in the cost of external funds is larger for firms with
high leverage ratios. As a result, the investment rate is substantially lower for such firms.
Figure 4 plots the response of investment to the same experiment for firms with a high
export share (midpoint of fourth quartile) and a low foreign-denominated debt ratio (midpoint
of first quartile). Results are again reported for leverage ratios that vary from the first to the
fourth quartile. For firms that export, the devaluation combined with macroeconomic shocks
implies an increase in sales and investment. The external finance premium rises by 0 to 3
percentage points depending on their initial leverage position. Again, the firms with high
leverage experience a greater increase in the premium and a lower rate of investment in the
initial period relative to firms with low initial leverage.
We now consider the aggregate implications of our structural estimates. Figure 5 simu-
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Figure 5: Aggregate Investment with Counterfactuals, ρe = 0.85.
lates the aggregate eﬀect of the crisis, along with several counterfactual scenarios. To compute
these simulations, we again feed in the macroeconomic shocks and compute the simulated path
of investment for each of our firm types. We then compute the weighted average of this re-
sponse, using the empirical distribution to compute the weights.27 The resulting path for
investment is plotted in the solid line in figure 5. We conduct three counterfactual experi-
ments. First, we assume that foreign-denominated debt is zero (dot-dash line). Second, we
assume that κ = 0, so that financial frictions play no role in the dynamics (dashed line).
Third, we assume that all firms have a foreign-denominated debt ratio of fifty percent (dotted
line). The foreign-denominated debt ratio in this last experiment are consistent with the
ratios observed in Latin American economies during the 1980’s and 1990s’.
Using the existing distribution of foreign-denominated debt, the simulation implies an
80% reduction in investment. This matches the observed drop in investment during the crisis.
Foreign-denominated debt plays only a small role in the model’s aggregate investment
dynamics — it accounts for less that 5% of the decline. This finding is consistent with the
27Value weighted responses imply similar results across counterfactuals.
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reduced form estimates which suggest that investment fell by one-half a percentage point owing
to the presence of foreign-denominated debt. Our counterfactual simulation also considers
the eﬀect of a foreign-denominated debt ratio that is much higher than what we observed
in the data. The average value in the data is 14%. The dashed line reports the eﬀect of
the devaluation under the assumption that all firms have a 50% foreign-denominated debt
ratio. This counterfactual implies an additional 18% decline in investment. This is somewhat
higher than the eﬀect that one would compute using the reduced-form estimates which imply a
13% decline in investment owing to such an increase in the foreign-denominated debt ratio.28
Intuitively, the model is non-linear in the financial mechanism, at higher levels of foreign-
denominated debt, more firms are pushed into a region where the dividend constraint binds
following the contraction. For such firms, the response of investment is particularly large.
Although foreign-denominated debt does not play an important role in determining the
aggregate investment response, financial frictions are clearly an important determinant of
investment dynamics. The increase in the domestic interest rate combined with the 20%
reduction in demand cause a contraction in internal funds and therefore an increase in the
premium on external funds. Without this financial mechanism, the negative consequences of
the crisis are oﬀset by the positive eﬀect of the devaluation working through the competitive-
ness channel, and the anticipated drop in future interest rates under UIP. As a result, with
financial frictions, the model predicts an 80% fall in investment, whereas, absent financial
frictions, the model predicts a 20% fall in investment.
Figure 6 considers the same experiment but increases the persistence of the exchange rate
to ρ = 0.9. With greater exchange rate persistence, firms no longer expect future interest rates
to revert as quickly under UIP. For unconstrained firms, the initial response of investment
depends strongly on the future path of interest rates. As a result, the main diﬀerence between
the ρ = 0.85 and ρ = 0.90 case is that the aggregate investment path for the case κ = 0 (no
financial constraints) is lower when the exchange rate is perceived to be more persistent. Even
in this case however, financial frictions still account for 50% of the overall drop in investment
during the crisis period.
28The reduced form eﬀect of increasing the foreign-denominated debt ratio is computingh
βˆ Ω(e, e−1;ω0)(b/a)− βˆ Ω(e, e−1;ω)(b/a)
i
where Ω(e, e−1;ω) = (1− ω) + ωe/e−1. Assuming that βˆ = 0.21,
b/a = 0.4 ,and e/e−1 = 1.7, and letting ω0 = 0.5 and ω = 0.14 we obtain an estimated response to the
investment rate of 0.02. At a mean investment rate of 16%, this implies a 13% decline in investment.
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Figure 6: Aggregate Investment with Counterfactuals, ρe = 0.90.
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6 Conclusion:
This paper studies the eﬀect of financial factors working through the balance sheet on in-
vestment spending during the Korean financial crisis. Our identification strategy combines
reduced-form regression analysis and structural econometric estimation. We exploit firm-level
heterogeneity in foreign-denominated debt ratios to identify shocks to the balance sheet that
are distinct from shocks to fundamentals. By allowing for both adjustment costs and financial
frictions, the structural model successfully replicates the reduced-form investment regression.
The structural parameter estimates imply that the presence of foreign-denominated debt ex-
erted a strong influence on investment at the firm-level.
Our structural parameter estimates allow us to conduct counterfactual exercises. These
exercises imply that foreign-denominated debt plays an important role in explaining hetero-
geneous outcomes across firms. The overall eﬀect of foreign-denominated debt was negligible
during the crisis period however — accounting for at most one half a percent drop in aggregate
investment. This finding is primarily due to the fact that the foreign-denominated debt ratio
of the average Korean firm is relative small. Increasing the foreign-denominated debt ratio to
50% would lead to an additional 18% fall in investment. This result suggests that investment
may indeed be sensitive to the presence of foreign-denominated debt in countries where the
foreign-denominated debt ratios are suﬃciently large.
Although foreign-denominated debt does not play an important role in investment dy-
namics during this time period, our structural estimates imply that financial frictions account
for a large fraction of the investment decline. The rise in domestic interest rates combined
with the fall in domestic GDP caused a deterioration of corporate balance sheets and a rise
in the cost of external finance. According to our estimates, these factors can account for one
half to three-fourths of the overall investment decline during the Korean financial crisis.
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Appendix A: Indeterminancy of foreign-denominated debt ratio under UIP
We show that the foreign-denominated debt ratio is indeterminate if the agency cost is
independent of the foreign-denominated debt ratio. To see the eﬀects on the firm value of
changing foreign-denominated debt ratio, consider a situation where the firm is allowed to
readjust the debt ratio each time period. In this case, the dynamic programming problem of
the firm is given by
v(k, b, ω, z, z−1) = max
k0,b0,ω0,d
½
(1 + λ)d+ μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z)v(k, b, ω, z0, z)Q(z,dz0)
¾
where
d =
ÃX
i=d,f
φi (z) k
γi − σ
!
− i− c(i, k)−
µ
e
e−1
¶
Rfωb0 −Rd(1− ω)b+ b0
and b0 ≡ b0d + eb0f = [(1 − ω0) + ω0]b0. Notice that the foreign-denominated debt is not
parametrized any more.
Using the envelope theorem, the eﬀects on the firm value of readjusting the debt ratio is
given by Z
z0
Λ(z0, z)
∂
∂ω0
v(k0, b0, ω0, z0, z)Q(z,dz0)
= − (1 + η0) b0
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) (1 + λ0)
∙µ
e0
e
¶
(1 + r0f)− (1 + r0d)
¸
Q(z,dz0)
Indeterminacy requires that the above expression is identically zero regardless of the foreign
debt ratio. Since (1 + η0) b0 > 0, this implies that
0 =
Z
z0
½
(1 + λ0)Λ(z0, z)
∙µ
e0
e
¶
(1 + r0f)− (1 + r0d)
¸¾
Q(z,dz0)
Notice that the above expression is composed of two terms: the first term is the shadow value
of the internal fund tomorrow. The second term can be considered as the shock to the UIP
condition, i.e., news to the foreign exchange market. To see this last aspect, we can rewrite
the bracketed term as
(1 + r0f)
∙µ
e0
e
¶
−E
µ
e0
e
|z
¶¸
Therefore, the indeterminacy requires that the product of shadow value of the internal fund
tomorrow and unanticipated news to the foreign exchange market should be expected to be
zero once the current information set is controlled.
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To show that this is the case indeed, we consider the original form of the dynamic program
in which the firm chooses the domestic and foreign-denominated debt separately each time
period, i.e.,
v(k, bd, bf , z, z−1) = max
k0,b0d,b
0
f ,d
½
(1 + λ) d+ μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z)v(k0, b0d, b
0
f , z
0, z)Q(z,dz0)
¾
where
d =
ÃX
i=d,f
φi (z) k
γi − σ
!
− i− c(i, k)−Rdbd − eRfbf + b0d + eb0f
The FOCs for domestic and foreign-denominated debts are given by
1 + λ = μ
Z
z0
∙
Λ(z0, z) (1 + λ0)
µ
R0d +
∂R0d
∂b0d
b0d +
∂R0f
∂b0d
e0b0f
¶¸
Q(z,dz0)
and
1 + λ = μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) (1 + λ0)
"µ
1
e
¶
∂R0d
∂b0f
b0d +
µ
e0
e
¶
R0f +
∂R0f
∂b0f
µ
e0
e
¶
b0f
#
Q(z,dz0)
Note that since b0 = b0d+eb
0
f , we can write
∂R0d
∂b0d
=
∂R0d
∂b0 ,
∂R0f
∂b0d
=
∂R0f
∂b0 ,
∂R0d
∂b0f
=
∂R0d
∂b0 e and
∂R0f
∂b0f
=
∂R0f
∂b0 e.
Substituting these expression in the FOCs, we have
1 + λ = μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) (1 + λ0)
µ
R0d +
∂R0d
∂b0
b0d +
∂R0f
∂b0
e0b0f
¶
|zQ(z,dz0)
and
1 + λ = μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) (1 + λ0)
∙
∂R0d
∂b0
b0d +
µ
e0
e
¶
R0f +
∂R0f
∂b0
e0b0f
¸
Q(z,dz0)
Subtracting the first from the second results in
0 = μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) (1 + λ0)
∙µ
e0
e
¶
R0f −R0d
¸
Q(z,dz0)
= μ(1 + η0)
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) (1 + λ0)
∙µ
e0
e
¶
(1 + r0f)− (1 + r0d)
¸
Q(z,dz0)
Therefore, we can see thatZ
z0
Λ(z0, z)
∂
∂ω0
v(k0, b0, ω0, z0, z)Q(z,dz0) = 0
43
identically regardless of the foreign-denominated debt ratio.
In case where the agency cost is aﬀected by the foreign-denominated debt ratio, the
eﬀects on the firm value is slightly modified intoZ
z0
Λ(z0, z)
∂
∂ω0
v(k0, b0, ω0, z0, z)Q(z,dz0)
= −
∙
(1 + η0) b0 +
∂η0
∂ω0
ωb0
¸
×
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) (1 + λ0)
∙µ
e0
e
¶
(1 + r0f)− (1 + r0d)
¸
Q(z,dz0)
− ∂η
0
∂ω0
b0
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) (1 + λ0) (1 + r0d)Q(z,dz
0)
By the same logic, we can see that the first term of the above expression is identically zero.
However, the second term is not zero identically by the assumption.
If the agency cost is monotonic in the foreign-denominated debt ratio, the optimal debt
ratio will have a boundary solution, i.e., either 0 or 1. If the agency cost is not monotonic,
then the optimal policy may have inner solutions.
Appendix B: Derivation of the Profit Function.
The production technology is specified as
yj,t =
"
yd,j,t
yf,j,t
#
= zj,tkναt,j
"
nν(1−α)d,j,t m
1−ν
d,j,t
nν(1−α)f,j,t m
1−ν
f,j,t
#
The demand function in each market is given by
yi,j,t = θi,jp−ii,j,tZi,t for i = d, f
The profit function is then defined by
πj,t = pd,j,tyd,j,t + etpf,j,tyf,j,t − σ
−wn,t(nd,j,t + nf,j,t)− etwm,t (md,j,t +mf,j,t)
Using the definition of market demands, the profit can be rewritten as
πj,t = (θd,jZd,t)1−χdy
χd
d,j,t + et(θf,jZf,t)
1−χfy
χf
f,j,t − σ
−wn,t(nd,j,t + nf,j,t)− etwm,t (md,j,t +mf,j,t)
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where χi ≡ (i − 1) /i for i = d, f . Static optimization with respect to variable inputs, mi,j,t
and ni,j,t for i = d, f leads to the following conditional variable input demand functions,
ni,j,t = ν(1− α)χi
si,j,t
wn,t
mi,j,t = (1− ν)χi
si,j,t
etwm,t
where
si,j,t ≡ e1(i=f)t (θi,jZi,t)1−χiz
χi
j,tk
ναχi
t,j n
ν(1−α)χi
i,j,t m
(1−ν)χi
i,j,t
the sales of the firm j in market i at time t. 1(i = f) is an indicator function which takes 1
when i = f and 0 otherwise. Thus input demands are proportional to sales in each market.
Substituting the conditional input demand functions in the profit function, we have
πj,t =
X
i=d,f
Γisi,j,t − σ
where
Γi = 1− χi(1− να)
In case of perfect competition, χi = 1 and Γi = να, which is the capital share in the production
function.
To obtain the closed form profit function, substitute the conditional demand functions
in the sales functions:
si,j,t = θ
(1−χi)/Γi
i,j Ξi,tz
χi/Γi
j,t e
(1(i=f)−(1−ν)χi)/Γi
t k
ναχi/Γi
j,t
where
Ξi,t ≡ Ψi
"
Z(1−χi)i,t
wν(1−α)χin,t w
(1−ν)χi
m,t
#1/Γi
and
Ψi ≡
h
(ν(1− α)χi)ν(1−α)χi ((1− ν)χi)(1−ν)χi
i1/Γi
.
The term Ξi,t represents the common (across firms) aggregated component of profits
in the domestic and foreign market respectively. We assume that the common aggregate
component can be represented as a log-linear combination of the relevant aggregate economic
activity variable in each market, yi,t and the exchange rate
logΞi,t = ψi + αi log yi,t + βiet
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in which case the log sales equation becomes:
log si,j,t = logψi + ς i ln θi,j + ξi ln et + γi ln kj,t + αi log yi,t + vi,t,
where the key elasticity in the sales equation is
γi =
ναχi
1− χi(1− να)
.
Given an estimate for the production share of capital, vα, and an estimate of γi, we can
obtain an estimate of the relevant mark-up in each market 1/χi along with the weights
Γi = 1− χi(1− να)
necessary to construct the profit function.
The coeﬃcient on the exchange rate in the sales equation satisfies ξi = βi+
1(i=f)−χi(1−ν)
1−χi(1−να)
.
If exchange rates only influence sales through their direct eﬀect on profits and have no indirect
eﬀect through their impact on the macro factor Ξi,t, we expect ξi =
1(i=f)−χi(1−ν)
1−χi(1−να)
which
implies a restriction on the sales equation coeﬃcients. If the macro factor depends on the
exchange rate, this restriction does not hold however. Alternatively, imperfect pass through of
exchange rates to prices could also lead to deviations between the estimated parameter ξi and
the implied structural parameter 1(i=f)−χi(1−ν)
1−χi(1−να)
. In practice, our estimates imply substantial
deviations from the restriction ξi =
1(i=f)−χi(1−ν)
1−χi(1−να)
.
The market demand has a constant proportionality term, θi,j. The constant term may
be interpreted as the steady state size of the market for the product j in market i because the
steady state implies yi,j,ss = θi,j (for a symmetric equilibrium). Note that the closed-form sales
functions also have proportionality factors which are determined by θi,j. The sales functions
are composed of a time-invariant component (θ(1−χi)/Γii,j ) and a time-varying component s˜i,j,t
where s˜i,j,t ≡ Ξi,tzχi/Γij,t e
(1(i=f)−(1−ν)χi)/Γi
t k
ναχi/Γi
j,t . To simplify the functional form of the sales
equations, we rewrite them as
πj,t = ηj
X
i=d,f
Γiηi,j s˜i,j,t − σj
where ηj ≡
P
i=d,f θ
(1−χi)/Γi
i,j and ηi,j ≡ θ
(1−χi)/Γi
i,j /
P
i=d,f θ
(1−χi)/Γi
i,j . We then normalize the
term ηj to unity and assume that σj is also normalized by the same factor so that the fixed-
cost to sales ratio is invariant across firms. We then approximate ηi,j using the export-sales
ratio of a firm combined with the estimated Γi so that η˜i,j ≡ Γi(si,j,ss/
P
i=d,f si,j,ss). This
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approximation is exact (i.e. η˜ij = ηij)when all functional assumptions are satisfied and the
firm has the same market powers in all markets. Profits can now be approximated as a
weighted average of the time-varying component of sales, s˜i,j,t :
πj,t =
X
i=d,f
η˜i,j s˜i,j,t − σj
=
X
i=d,f
φi,j (zt) k
γi
j,t − σj
where φi,j (zt) ≡ η˜i,j[Ξi,tz
χi/Γi
j,t e
(1(i=f)−(1−ν)χi)/Γi
t ] and γi ≡ ναχi/Γi. Therefore, given the
weights η˜i,j, the profit function may be computed directly from the sales equations. To
determine the weight, we compute Γi = 1 − χi(1 − να) using the estimated χi of the gross
profit function and set vα = 0.225. We calibrate the ratio si,j,ss/
P
i=d,f si,j,ss using the
pre-crisis mean export-sales ratio for each firm.
Appendix C: Computational Method.
We transform the FOC into forms more convenient for computation in the following way
1 + λ
b0
= μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z)
1 + λ0
b00
b00
b0
Ω(e0, e;ω) (1 + r0d)
µ
1 + η0 +
∂η0
∂b0
b0
¶
Q(z,dz0)
andµ
1 +
∂c
∂i
(i, k)
¶
1 + λ
b0
= μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z)
1 + λ0
b00
b00
b0
∙
∂d0
∂k0
+ (1− δ)
µ
1 +
∂c
∂i0
(i0, k0)
¶¸
Q(z,dz0)
where
∂d0
∂k0
=
X
i=d,f
αjφi (z) k
αj−1 − ∂c
∂k0
(i0, k0)− Ω(e0, e;ω) (1 + r0d)
∂η0
∂k0
b0
We adopt a version of Chebyshev projection method (Judd (1992) and Christiano and
Fisher (2000)). We approximate the conditional expectations of the model using orthogonal
polynomials, i.e.,
exp(hb(u)) '
Z
z0
∙
Λ(z0, z)
1 + λ0
b00
b00
b0
Ω(e0, e;ω) (1 + r0d)
µ
1 + η0 +
∂η0
∂b0
b0
¶¸
Q(z,dz0)
and
exp(hk(u)) '
Z
z0
½
Λ(z0, z)
1 + λ0
b00
b00
b0
∙
∂d0
∂k0
+ (1− δ)
µ
1 +
∂c
∂i0
(i0, k0)
¶¸¾
Q(z,dz0)
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where hb (·) and hk (·) are Chebyshev polynomials and u is a vector of logged state variables.
The choice for the conditional expectations rather than the policy and the multiplier functions
as the objects of approximation is due to relative smoothness of the conditional expectation
functions(See Christiano and Fisher (2000)).
Assuming that the approximating functions are close enough to the actual conditional
expectations, we can reconstruct the system of the equations using those approximating func-
tions in the following way. Dividing the FOC for k0 by the FOC for b0, we can derive an
expression for Tobin’s q in terms of the approximating functions, i.e.,
q(i/k) ≡ 1 + ∂c
∂i
(i, k) ' exp(hk(u))
exp(hb(u))
Under the functional assumptions we adopt regarding the capital adjustment cost, Tobin’s q
is invertible for investment ratio and therefore
i (u) ' q−1
∙
exp(hk(u))
exp(hb(u))
¸
k
and
k0 (u) '
½
q−1
∙
exp(hk(u))
exp(hb(u))
¸
+ (1− δ)
¾
k
The optimal debt policy can be computed using this investment policy. The debt policy
is given by
b0 (u) '
½
[μ exp (hb (u))]
−1
b¯0 (u)
if [μ exp (hb (u))]
−1 ≥ b¯0 (u)
if [μ exp (hb (u))]
−1 < b¯0 (u)
or more simply
b0 (u) ' max©b¯0 (u) , [μ exp (hb (u))]−1ª
where b¯0 (u) is the minimum level of debt finance satisfying the dividend constraint, i.e.,
b¯0 (u) ≡ σ + i (u) + c(i (u) , k) + b˜−
X
i=d,f
φi (z) k
γi
Note that the max function in the debt policy is replaced with a smooth max function in the
actual computation.29 Since the investment and debt policies are constructed, the dividend
29For instance, max(x, 0) ' x + 1α log(1 + exp(−x)). The greater α results in the less smooth the
approximation.
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policy is simply given by the definition, i.e.,
d (u) '
ÃX
i=d,f
φi (z) k
γi − σ
!
− i (u)− c(i (u) , k)− b˜+ b0 (u)
Finally, the shadow value of the internal fund can be computed as
λ (u) =
b0 (u)
[μ exp (hb (u))]
−1 − 1
Notice that the shadow value is computed as the vertical distance between the constrained
policy, b0 (u) and the unconstrained policy, [(βμ) exp (hb (u))]
−1. Since the constrained policy
cannot be less than the unconstrained policy, the Lagrange multiplier cannot take a negative
value regardless of correctness of the approximated functions.30
The recursive nature of the functional equations can be seen in the following.
exp(hb(u)) ' μ
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) exp(hb(u0))
b00(u0)
b0(u)
×Ω(e0, e;ω) (1 + r0d)
µ
1 + η0(u) +
∂η0
∂b0
(u)b0(u)
¶
Q(z,dz0)
30There could be other transformations to enable us to identify the policy variable. However, some of them
do not satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker condition. For instance, a possible invertible form might be
b0 (1 + λ) = μE
∙
Λ(z0, z)b00(1 + λ0)
b0
b00
Ω(e0, e;ω) (1 + r0d)
µ
1 + η0 +
∂η0
∂b0
b0
¶
|z
¸
In this case we parameterize the conditional exectation to get
b0 (1 + λ) = μ exp(hb(u))
If the constraint is nonbinding, the debt policy is given by b0(u) = βμ exp(hb(u)). If the constraint is binding
the policy is given by b0(u) = b¯0(u) ≡ σk + i(u) + c(i(u), k)−
P
i φi(z)k
γi . Finally the Lagrangian multiplier
is calculated as
λ =
μ exp(hb(u))
b0(u)
− 1
If the constraint is nonbinding, this formula correctly gives λ = 0. However, if the constraint is binding where
the unconstrained policy is lower than the constrained policy, this formula returns a negative value for the
multiplier.
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and
exp(hk(u)) ' (βμ)
Z
z0
Λ(z0, z) exp(hb(u0))
b00(u0)
b0(u)
×
∙
∂
∂k0
d0(u0) + (1− δ) exp(hk(u
0))
exp(hb(u0))
¸
Q(z,dz0)
Since these are not contraction mappings, a nonlinear numerical equation solver must be
adopted for the solutions. The integrations over the future uncertainties are replaced by
Gauss-Hermite quadratures in the actual computations. When applying this solution method,
we use a complete basis computed from a second-order chebyshev polynomials in each of the
state variables. The resulting second-order approximation in logs is suﬃciently non-linear to
capture higher order eﬀects when computing conditional expectations.
Appendix D: The Determination of Steady State and Fixed Cost
In the steady state, the Euler equations may be expressed as
1 = μβ
∙
(1 + rd,ss)
µ
1 + ηss +
∂ηss
∂bss
bss
¶¸
and
1 = μβ
"X
i=d,f
αjφi (zss) k
αj−1
ss − (1 + rd,ss)
∂ηss
∂kss
bss + (1− δ)
#
where we use βΛ(zss, zss) = β, λ0ss = λss, ess = 1 and Ω(ess, ess;ω) = 1. Under the functional
form assumptions, it is straight forward to show that ηss and
∂ηss
∂bss
bss are solely determined
by the steady-state leverage ratio, bss/kss. We assume that all firms have an identical long
run leverage ratio which is calibrated from the post-crisis mean level of leverage in the data.
An implicit assumption behind the use of post crisis mean is that the pre crisis mean level
of leverage ratio was higher than the long run level. Although this assumption does not
seriously aﬀect the estimation results, it captures the realistic notion that firm balance sheets
were extended at the onset of the crisis.
For a given parameter estimate κ, the first Euler equation may be used to back out the
survival probability μ that is consistent with this long-run leverage ratio. The information of
the leverage ratio and the survival probability can then be used in the second Euler equation
to determine the steady-state level of capital. Note that the steady-state level of capital diﬀers
across heterogeneous firms to the extent that diﬀerent firms have diﬀerent steady-state export-
sales ratios owing to the nonhomogeneous curvatures of the profit functions for domestic and
foreign markets. Finally, the long-run leverage ratio and capital then determines the long-run
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level of debt.
Once the steady state capital stock is determined, the fixed cost can be calibrated from
the data. In case we assume that the fixed cost is proportional to the steady state level of
capital, we write σ = cFkss where cF is the proportionality factor. The operating income to
capital ratio in the data is given by OIK = (P − F ) /K = (S − C − F )/K where P , S, C,
F and K are accounting data on profit, sales, cost, fixed cost(the item, Sales and General
Management Cost) and capital. The same ratio in the model is given by
OIK =
X
i=d,f
φi(zss)k
γi−1
ss − σ/kss =
X
i=d,f
φi(zss)k
γi−1
ss − cF
where φi(zss)k
γi−1
ss = Γi(s/k)i are determined by the estimates of Γi in conjunction with
the mean sales-to-capital ratio in each market. The proportionality factor cF may then be
computed as
cF =
X
i=d,f
φi(zss)k
γi−1
ss −OIK =
X
i=d,f
φi(zss)k
γi−1
ss − 0.241
We use the pre-crisis mean of the operating income ratio(0.241) to determine cF .
If we assume that the fixed cost is proportional to the steady-state sales, we write σ =
cF
P
i=d,f φi(zss)k
γi
ss . The operating income ratio in the model is then given by
OIK = (1− cF )
X
i=d,f
φi(zss)k
γi−1
ss
We can then determine the fixed cost parameter cF as
cF = 1−
OIKP
i=d,f φi(zss)k
γi−1
ss
= 1− 0.241P
i=d,f φi(zss)k
γi−1
ss
These procedures provides identical results since they are just diﬀerent methods of applying
the same constraint.
Appendix E: Data Construction.
We construct standard ratios for investment and sales relative to capital. All variables
are deflated by the appropriate price indices. Investment spending is deflated by the capital
goods price index from the producer price index; domestic sales, total debt and total assets
are deflated by the producer price index for manufacturing; and foreign sales are deflated
by the export price index. Investment data are constructed as the diﬀerence between the
Increase in Tangible Asset and the Decrease in Tangible Asset variables from the Cash Flow
Statement. All other variables in the regression are extracted from either the Balance Sheet
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Table 11: Macroeconomic Variables
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Z 2.295 3.771 3.852 −7.268 −2.552 0.912 −0.149 1.753
e 0.760 0.743 0.799 1.3799 1.044 1.008 1.123 1.154
rd 7.996 7.542 8.966 7.826 4.119 2.816 0.632 1.526
ξ 1.879 1.086 3.600 10.65 2.765 0.936 0.372 1.675
or Income Statement.
The real capital stock data is constructed according to the perpetual inventory method,
i.e.,
kj,t+1 = (1− δ)kj,t +
Ij,t
Pk,t
(25)
where Ij,t is nominal investment spending of firm j and Pk,t is the capital goods price index.
This way of constructing of the real capital stock requires an information for initial value,
kj,0 ≡ Kj,0/P˜k,0 where P˜k,0 is the price index for installed capital at time 0. Since this price
level is not available, we deflate the initial nominal capital stock by the capital price index,
Pk,0. To exclude the influences of extreme observations, our sample is constructed using a
cut-oﬀ rule which drops outliers defined as observations in the lowest and the highest 0.5% of
the sample.
Table 11 reports the actual values of the macroeconomic variables that are used in the
estimation and simulation of the structural model. These macroeconomic variables are com-
puted on an annual basis. Table 11 reports the values for the demand shifter Z (HP-filtered
real GDP), the real exchange rate e, the domestic real rate rd, and the implied country-risk
premium, ξ, which may be obtained backed out of the UIP condition given the data for the
exchange rate and the domestic real rate. On an annual basis, the crisis (1998) generated a
10% drop in the demand factor Z, a 70% devaluation and a seven percentage point rise in
the country-risk premium.
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